kingchenc
d59cd44043
* docs: standardise language naming and add binding security sections Canonical binding list everywhere: Rust, Python, Node.js, WASM, C, C++, C#, Go, Java, R. Use C# (not .NET) as the language label, WASM (not WebAssembly) in prose, and frame the C ABI as a hub rather than a list item. - Bump stale indicator counts (200+ -> 514) and family count (sixteen -> twenty-four) in the Node/Python/WASM and docs READMEs. - Add a short Security section to all eight binding READMEs. - Relabel benchmark rows (C -> C / C++, C# / .NET -> C#). - Fix the 'language stecker' wording in the C#/Go/R API intros. - Documentation only; no code or public API changes. * release.yml: extend install snippets and expose version output Add the missing registry installs to the release body (dotnet, go, Gradle/ Maven Central, r-universe) alongside cargo/pip/npm, and expose a v-stripped 'version' output from the tag step for the Gradle coordinate. Also fix the C-ABI language order in the assets note (C# before Go). * release.yml: correct the release body (10 languages, all registries) Reframe the tagline to '10 languages' (native Rust/Python/Node.js/WASM + a C ABI hub for C, C++, C#, Go, Java, R) instead of '4 language registries', note that C#/Java/Go/R publish to NuGet/Maven/Go/r-universe via their own jobs, and tidy the Node.js label and the C-ABI hub list.
58 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
58 lines
4.2 KiB
Markdown
# Threat model
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This document describes Wickra's attack surface and the threats considered,
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together with their mitigations. It complements the security assurance case in
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[`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). Wickra is a computational technical-analysis
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library (a Rust core with Python, Node.js and WASM bindings plus a C ABI
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and the C#, Go, Java and R bindings built on it),
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not a network service or trading system; the attack surface is correspondingly
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small.
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## Assets
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- **Integrity of computed indicator values** — consumers may use them in
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automated decisions, so silently wrong output is the primary concern.
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- **Availability of the calling process** — a library must not crash or hang
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its host on malformed input.
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- **Integrity of published artifacts** — the crates, wheels and npm packages
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users install.
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- **The build and release pipeline** and its secrets (publishing tokens).
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## Actors / trust boundaries
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- **Library consumer** (trusted) — calls the API with numeric data. Data may
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originate from untrusted sources (e.g. a market feed), so *input values* are
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treated as untrusted even though the caller is trusted.
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- **Optional live feed** — with the `live-binance` feature, data crosses a
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network boundary from an exchange over TLS.
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- **Contributors** (semi-trusted) — propose changes via pull requests.
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- **Supply chain** — upstream dependencies and the CI/CD platform.
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## Threats and mitigations
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| Threat | Mitigation |
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| --- | --- |
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| Memory-safety exploit (buffer overflow, UAF) via crafted input | Pure safe Rust; `unsafe` is forbidden/minimised, so the compiler precludes these classes. |
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| Misuse of the C ABI FFI boundary (invalid/dangling handle, undersized batch buffer) | The C ABI (`bindings/c`) is the sole `unsafe` surface. Its shim adds no logic, NULL-checks every handle (returning `NaN`/no-op), writes only into caller-sized buffers, and is built with `panic = "abort"` so a panic terminates the process deterministically instead of unwinding across the FFI boundary (which would be undefined behaviour). A caller passing a non-NULL but dangling pointer is undefined behaviour by C's own contract — out of scope, the same as any C library. |
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| Denial of service via malformed/degenerate input (NaN, infinities, extreme magnitudes) | Indicators reject non-finite inputs and validate parameters at construction; update paths are exercised by coverage-guided fuzzing and unit tests for edge cases. |
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| Silently incorrect results | 100% line coverage on the core crate; reference-value tests against known-good sources; streaming/batch parity tests. |
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| Integer overflow / panics | `clippy::pedantic` with `-D warnings`; debug assertions and overflow checks enabled in test/fuzz builds. |
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| Adversary-in-the-middle on the optional live feed | Connection uses TLS via the platform library; transport security is delegated to that reviewed implementation. |
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| Compromised dependency (supply chain) | Dependencies pinned (`Cargo.lock`, hash-locked CI requirements), monitored by Dependabot, audited by `cargo-deny` (advisories + licenses) on every change. |
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| Malicious or accidental change to `main` | Branch protection requires signed commits and blocks force-push and deletion; all changes flow through pull requests with required CI; static analysis (CodeQL, Clippy) and fuzzing run on every change. |
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| Compromised CI / leaked secrets | Workflows use least-privilege `permissions:`; secrets live only as encrypted GitHub Actions secrets; secret scanning with push protection is enabled; workflows are linted by `zizmor`. |
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| Tampered release artifact | Releases are built in CI, tags are signed, and assets carry build provenance attestations (verifiable with `gh attestation verify`). |
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## Out of scope
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- Wickra implements no authentication, authorization or cryptography of its own,
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stores no user data, and exposes no network listener; those threat classes do
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not apply.
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- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that do not affect Wickra are
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tracked as exploitability (VEX) records (see [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)).
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## Maintenance
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This threat model is reviewed when the architecture changes materially (for
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example, a new input family, a new network feature, or a new release channel).
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