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Stacked on #222 (base `feat/c-abi-hub`), so the diff is just the additions on top of the hub foundation — no merge of #222 required. ## What this adds **Examples — full parity with rust/python/node (`examples/c/`)** - `streaming.c` upgraded to the multi-indicator (SMA/EMA/RSI/MACD + signals) demo - `backtest.c`, `multi_timeframe.c` (manual time-bucket resampling), `parallel_assets.c` (serial vs OpenMP fan-out, one handle per asset) - three educational strategies: `strategy_rsi_mean_reversion.c`, `strategy_macd_adx.c`, `strategy_bollinger_squeeze.c` - two network examples shelling out to `curl`: `fetch_btcusdt.c`, `live_binance.c` (REST poll) - two header-only helpers (`wickra_csv.h`, `wickra_strategy.h`) since the C ABI ships no IO layer - CMake builds all 11; the 9 offline ones run under `ctest` on 3 OS; the network two are built-only **Docs & metadata — surface the C ABI everywhere it was missing** - ARCHITECTURE diagram + crate table, SECURITY + THREAT_MODEL (the C ABI as the sole `unsafe` FFI surface), the three binding package READMEs, issue/PR templates, CHANGELOG, and the GitHub About template (live About + org description updated too) **Cleanup** - removed all references to the private generator tooling from public files (`bindings/c/src/lib.rs` header, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, `sync-about.yml`) Verified locally: `cargo build -p wickra-c --release`, `cmake + ctest` (9/9 pass), and `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic` clean on gcc 13.
57 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
57 lines
4.0 KiB
Markdown
# Threat model
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This document describes Wickra's attack surface and the threats considered,
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together with their mitigations. It complements the security assurance case in
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[`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). Wickra is a computational technical-analysis
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library (a Rust core with Python, Node.js and WebAssembly bindings plus a C ABI),
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not a network service or trading system; the attack surface is correspondingly
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small.
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## Assets
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- **Integrity of computed indicator values** — consumers may use them in
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automated decisions, so silently wrong output is the primary concern.
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- **Availability of the calling process** — a library must not crash or hang
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its host on malformed input.
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- **Integrity of published artifacts** — the crates, wheels and npm packages
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users install.
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- **The build and release pipeline** and its secrets (publishing tokens).
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## Actors / trust boundaries
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- **Library consumer** (trusted) — calls the API with numeric data. Data may
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originate from untrusted sources (e.g. a market feed), so *input values* are
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treated as untrusted even though the caller is trusted.
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- **Optional live feed** — with the `live-binance` feature, data crosses a
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network boundary from an exchange over TLS.
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- **Contributors** (semi-trusted) — propose changes via pull requests.
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- **Supply chain** — upstream dependencies and the CI/CD platform.
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## Threats and mitigations
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| Threat | Mitigation |
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| --- | --- |
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| Memory-safety exploit (buffer overflow, UAF) via crafted input | Pure safe Rust; `unsafe` is forbidden/minimised, so the compiler precludes these classes. |
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| Misuse of the C ABI FFI boundary (invalid/dangling handle, undersized batch buffer) | The C ABI (`bindings/c`) is the sole `unsafe` surface. Its shim adds no logic, NULL-checks every handle (returning `NaN`/no-op), writes only into caller-sized buffers, and catches panics so none cross the boundary. A caller passing a non-NULL but dangling pointer is undefined behaviour by C's own contract — out of scope, the same as any C library. |
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| Denial of service via malformed/degenerate input (NaN, infinities, extreme magnitudes) | Indicators reject non-finite inputs and validate parameters at construction; update paths are exercised by coverage-guided fuzzing and unit tests for edge cases. |
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| Silently incorrect results | 100% line coverage on the core crate; reference-value tests against known-good sources; streaming/batch parity tests. |
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| Integer overflow / panics | `clippy::pedantic` with `-D warnings`; debug assertions and overflow checks enabled in test/fuzz builds. |
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| Adversary-in-the-middle on the optional live feed | Connection uses TLS via the platform library; transport security is delegated to that reviewed implementation. |
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| Compromised dependency (supply chain) | Dependencies pinned (`Cargo.lock`, hash-locked CI requirements), monitored by Dependabot, audited by `cargo-deny` (advisories + licenses) on every change. |
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| Malicious or accidental change to `main` | Branch protection requires signed commits and blocks force-push and deletion; all changes flow through pull requests with required CI; static analysis (CodeQL, Clippy) and fuzzing run on every change. |
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| Compromised CI / leaked secrets | Workflows use least-privilege `permissions:`; secrets live only as encrypted GitHub Actions secrets; secret scanning with push protection is enabled; workflows are linted by `zizmor`. |
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| Tampered release artifact | Releases are built in CI, tags are signed, and assets carry build provenance attestations (verifiable with `gh attestation verify`). |
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## Out of scope
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- Wickra implements no authentication, authorization or cryptography of its own,
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stores no user data, and exposes no network listener; those threat classes do
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not apply.
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- Vulnerabilities in third-party dependencies that do not affect Wickra are
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tracked as exploitability (VEX) records (see [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md)).
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## Maintenance
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This threat model is reviewed when the architecture changes materially (for
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example, a new input family, a new network feature, or a new release channel).
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