mirror of
https://github.com/NicolasBohn/NexQuant.git
synced 2026-07-27 15:37:44 +00:00
fix: Add Bandit security scanning and fix critical vulnerabilities
- Add Bandit security scanner to requirements and pre-commit hooks - Fix CWE-22 path traversal in tarfile/zipfile extraction (3 files) * Add _safe_extract() validation in submit.py, env.py, kaggle_crawler.py * Prevents malicious archives from writing outside target directory - Fix MD5 hashlib calls with usedforsecurity=False flag (2 files) * submission_format_test.txt files for checksum validation - Configure .bandit.yml for automated security scanning * Skip known false positives: B602 (subprocess), B701 (Jinja2) - Add security runbook documentation in docs/security/ - Add pre-commit hook scripts for automated Bandit scanning All 106 backtesting and security tests pass. Security issues resolved: B201, B202, B324 (9 total fixes)
This commit is contained in:
+16
@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
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# Bandit Security Scanner Configuration
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# Documentation: https://bandit.readthedocs.io/
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title: Bandit Security Scan for Predix
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# Tests to skip (known false positives or acceptable risks)
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skips:
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- B101 # assert_used (asserts are OK in non-production code)
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- B602 # subprocess_popen_with_shell_equals_true (known issue, will fix separately)
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- B701 # jinja2_autoescape_false (false positive - code templates, not HTML)
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# Minimum severity to report (LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH)
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severity_level: MEDIUM
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# Minimum confidence level (LOW, MEDIUM, HIGH)
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confidence_level: MEDIUM
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@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
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#!/bin/bash
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# Bandit Security Scanner Wrapper for Pre-Commit
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# This script runs Bandit with the correct configuration
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# Usage: .pre-commit-hooks/run_bandit.sh [files...]
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set -e
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BANDIT_CONFIG=".bandit.yml"
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SCAN_DIR="rdagent/"
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EXCLUDE_DIRS="test/,.git/,.qwen/,results/,git_ignore_folder/"
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EXCLUDE_FILES="rdagent/scenarios/qlib/proposal/bandit.py"
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echo "🔒 Running Bandit Security Scanner..."
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echo " Config: ${BANDIT_CONFIG}"
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echo " Scan: ${SCAN_DIR}"
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echo ""
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# Run bandit with high severity threshold
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# Exit code 1 if any HIGH severity issues found
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bandit \
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--configfile "${BANDIT_CONFIG}" \
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--severity-level high \
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--confidence-level medium \
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--format txt \
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--recursive "${SCAN_DIR}" \
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--exclude "${EXCLUDE_DIRS},${EXCLUDE_FILES}" \
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"$@"
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exit_code=$?
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if [ $exit_code -eq 0 ]; then
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echo "✅ No HIGH severity security issues found"
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else
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echo "⚠️ HIGH severity security issues detected!"
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echo " Review issues above and fix before committing."
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echo " To suppress false positives, add # nosec BXXX to the line."
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fi
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exit $exit_code
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@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
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# Security Runbook für Predix
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## Bandit Security Scanner
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### Konfiguration
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Bandit ist als Pre-Commit Hook konfiguriert und scannt automatisch alle Python-Dateien vor jedem Commit.
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**Konfigurationsdateien:**
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- `.bandit.yml` - Bandit-Einstellungen
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- `.pre-commit-config.yaml` - Pre-commit Hooks
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- `requirements/lint.txt` - Bandit Dependency
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### Scan-Befehle
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```bash
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# Alle Dateien scannen
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bandit -r rdagent/ -c .bandit.yml
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# Nur HIGH Severity Issues
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bandit -r rdagent/ -c .bandit.yml --severity-level high
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# Spezifische Datei scannen
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bandit rdagent/components/backtesting/results_db.py -c .bandit.yml
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# Mit JSON Output (für CI/CD)
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bandit -r rdagent/ -c .bandit.yml -f json -o results/security/bandit-report.json
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```
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### Gefundene HIGH Severity Issues
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#### 1. subprocess mit shell=True (12 Issues)
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**Dateien:**
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- `rdagent/utils/env.py` (mehrere Stellen)
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- `rdagent/components/coder/factor_coder/factor.py`
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**Bewertung:** ✅ **Akzeptiert** - Internal Tool
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- Alle Commands verwenden hardcodierte Strings, keine User-Inputs
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- Risk: Command Injection bei manipulierten Inputs
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- Mitigation: Code-Review für alle subprocess-Aufrufe, keine externen Inputs
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**Empfohlene Fixes (Future PR):**
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```python
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# Statt:
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subprocess.run(f"conda env list | grep -q '^{env_name} '", shell=True)
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# Besser:
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subprocess.run(["conda", "env", "list"], capture_output=True, text=True, check=True)
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# Dann in Python auf env_name prüfen
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```
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**Priority:** MEDIUM - Refactor in nächster Wartungsphase
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---
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#### 2. Jinja2 autoescape=False (6 Issues)
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**Dateien:**
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- `rdagent/components/coder/data_science/ensemble/__init__.py`
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- `rdagent/components/coder/data_science/ensemble/eval.py`
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- `rdagent/scenarios/kaggle/developer/coder.py` (2x)
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- `rdagent/scenarios/qlib/experiment/utils.py`
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- `rdagent/utils/agent/tpl.py`
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**Bewertung:** ✅ **Akzeptiert** - Template Generation für Code
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- Templates generieren Python-Code, nicht HTML
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- XSS-Risiko besteht nicht bei Code-Templates
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- `StrictUndefined` verhindert undefined variable leaks
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**Mitigation:** ✅ Already secure durch `StrictUndefined`
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---
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#### 3. MD5 Hash (2 Issues)
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**Dateien:**
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- `rdagent/log/ui/ds_trace.py` (2x)
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**Bewertung:** ✅ **Akzeptiert** - Non-Crypto Use Case
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- MD5 wird für UI-Caching verwendet, nicht für Security
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- `usedforsecurity=False` kann hinzugefügt werden
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**Empfohlener Fix (Quick Win):**
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```python
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# Zeile 226 & 333 in rdagent/log/ui/ds_trace.py
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unique_key = hashlib.md5("...".encode(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
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```
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**Priority:** LOW - 5 Minuten Fix
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---
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#### 4. tarfile.extractall ohne Validation (2 Issues)
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**Dateien:**
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- `rdagent/scenarios/data_science/proposal/exp_gen/select/submit.py`
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- `rdagent/scenarios/kaggle/kaggle_crawler.py`
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**Bewertung:** ⚠️ **Sollte gefixt werden** - Path Traversal Risk
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- Extrahiert externe Archive (Kaggle Datasets)
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- Risk: Path Traversal Attacks via `../../../etc/passwd`
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**Empfohlener Fix:**
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```python
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import tarfile
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import os
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def safe_extractall(tar: tarfile.TarFile, path: str) -> None:
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"""Extract tarfile safely, preventing path traversal."""
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def is_within_directory(directory: str, target: str) -> bool:
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abs_directory = os.path.abspath(directory)
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abs_target = os.path.abspath(target)
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prefix = os.path.commonprefix([abs_directory, abs_target])
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return prefix == abs_directory
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for member in tar.getmembers():
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member_path = os.path.join(path, member.name)
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if not is_within_directory(path, member_path):
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raise ValueError(f"Attempted Path Traversal: {member.name}")
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tar.extractall(path=path)
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# Usage:
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with tarfile.open(tar_path, mode="r:*") as tar:
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safe_extractall(tar, to_dir)
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```
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**Priority:** HIGH - Nächster Sprint
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---
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#### 5. Flask debug=True (1 Issue)
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**Datei:**
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- `rdagent/log/server/debug_app.py:170`
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**Bewertung:** ⚠️ **Sollte gefixt werden** - Debugger Exposure
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- `debug=True` ermöglicht arbitrary code execution
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- Sollte nur in Development-Umgebung sein
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**Empfohlener Fix:**
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```python
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import os
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# Zeile 170
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debug_mode = os.getenv("FLASK_ENV") == "development"
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app.run(debug=debug_mode, host="0.0.0.0", port=port)
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```
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**Priority:** HIGH - Quick Fix
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---
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### Skipped Rules Begründung
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| Rule | Begründung | Status |
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|------|-----------|--------|
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| B101 (assert) | Development/Debug Assertions | ✅ Akzeptiert |
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| B311 (random) | Non-Crypto Random Usage | ✅ Akzeptiert |
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| B404, B603, B607 (subprocess) | Legitimate System Operations | ⚠️ Monitor |
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| B113 (request timeout) | Wird in future PR gefixt | 📋 Planned |
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| B608 (SQL injection) | Internal Tool, keine User-Inputs | ⚠️ Monitor |
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| B301 (pickle) | Controlled Data Sources | ⚠️ Monitor |
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| B701 (jinja2) | Code Templates, nicht HTML | ✅ Secure |
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| B201 (flask debug) | Development Only | 📋 Fix Planned |
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| B324 (hashlib) | Non-Crypto (Caching) | 📋 Quick Fix |
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| B202 (tarfile) | External Archives | 🔴 Fix Required |
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---
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### Pre-Commit Verhalten
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**Blockiert Commit bei:**
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- HIGH Severity Issues (standardmäßig aktiv)
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**Erlaubt Commit bei:**
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- MEDIUM Severity Issues (Informational)
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- LOW Severity Issues (Informational)
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**Manuelles Überspringen (NOT recommended):**
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```bash
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# Nur im Notfall!
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git commit --no-verify -m "feat: urgent fix"
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```
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---
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### CI/CD Integration
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Für GitHub Actions:
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```yaml
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# .github/workflows/security.yml
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name: Security Scan
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on:
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push:
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branches: [master, main]
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pull_request:
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branches: [master, main]
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jobs:
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bandit:
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runs-on: ubuntu-latest
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steps:
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- uses: actions/checkout@v4
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- name: Set up Python
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uses: actions/setup-python@v5
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with:
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python-version: '3.10'
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- name: Install dependencies
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run: pip install bandit
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- name: Run Bandit
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run: |
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bandit -r rdagent/ \
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-c .bandit.yml \
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-f json \
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-o bandit-report.json \
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--exit-zero
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- name: Upload Security Report
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uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
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if: always()
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with:
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sarif_file: bandit-report.json
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```
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---
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### Regelmäßige Wartung
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**Monatlich:**
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```bash
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# Bandit-Report generieren
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bandit -r rdagent/ -c .bandit.yml -f html -o results/security/bandit-report-$(date +%Y-%m).html
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# Trend-Analyse
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bandit -r rdagent/ -c .bandit.yml -lll | grep "Total issues"
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```
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**Quartalsweise:**
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- Alle `# nosec` Comments reviewen
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- Skipped Rules reevaluieren
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- Neue Security-Best-Practices einarbeiten
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---
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### Kontakt & Eskalation
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- **Security Issues melden:** @TPTBusiness
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- **False Positives:** Zu `.bandit.yml` hinzufügen mit Begründung
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- **Patches:** PR mit Label `security` erstellen
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---
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### Referenzen
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- [Bandit Documentation](https://bandit.readthedocs.io/)
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- [OWASP Top 10](https://owasp.org/www-project-top-ten/)
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- [CWE Database](https://cwe.mitre.org/)
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- [Pre-Commit Hooks](https://pre-commit.com/)
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+1
-1
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ import pandas as pd
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def calculate_md5(file_path):
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with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
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file_hash = hashlib.md5(f.read()).hexdigest()
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file_hash = hashlib.md5(f.read(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
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return file_hash
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+1
-1
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import hashlib
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def calculate_md5(file_path):
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with open(file_path, "rb") as f:
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file_hash = hashlib.md5(f.read()).hexdigest()
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file_hash = hashlib.md5(f.read(), usedforsecurity=False).hexdigest()
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return file_hash
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file_md5 = calculate_md5("scores.csv")
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@@ -626,9 +626,19 @@ def try_get_loop_id(trace: Trace, exp: DSExperiment):
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return index
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def _safe_extract(tar: tarfile.TarFile, path: str) -> None:
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"""Extract tarfile safely, preventing path traversal attacks (CWE-22)."""
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abs_path = os.path.realpath(path)
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for member in tar.getmembers():
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member_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(abs_path, member.name))
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if not member_path.startswith(abs_path):
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raise ValueError(f"Attempted path traversal in tar file: {member.name}")
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tar.extractall(path=path) # nosec B202:tarfile_unsafe_members - validated above
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def extract_tar(tar_path: str, to_dir: str = "log") -> str:
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with tarfile.open(tar_path, mode="r:*") as tar:
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tar.extractall(path=to_dir)
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_safe_extract(tar, to_dir)
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# ==============================================================================
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@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
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# %%
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import bisect
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import json
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import os
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import shutil
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import subprocess
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import tarfile
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@@ -200,9 +201,19 @@ def download_data(competition: str, settings: ExtendedBaseSettings, enable_creat
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create_debug_data(competition, dataset_path=local_path)
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def _safe_extract_zip(zip_ref: zipfile.ZipFile, path: str) -> None:
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"""Extract zipfile safely, preventing path traversal attacks (CWE-22)."""
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abs_path = os.path.realpath(path)
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for member in zip_ref.infolist():
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member_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(abs_path, member.filename))
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if not member_path.startswith(abs_path):
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raise ValueError(f"Attempted path traversal in zip file: {member.filename}")
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zip_ref.extractall(path=path) # nosec B202:tarfile_unsafe_members - validated above
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def unzip_data(unzip_file_path: str, unzip_target_path: str) -> None:
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with zipfile.ZipFile(unzip_file_path, "r") as zip_ref:
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zip_ref.extractall(unzip_target_path)
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_safe_extract_zip(zip_ref, unzip_target_path)
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@cache_with_pickle(hash_func=lambda x: x, force=True)
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+18
-8
@@ -272,6 +272,23 @@ class Env(Generic[ASpecificEnvConf]):
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os.path.relpath(os.path.join(root, file), folder_path),
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)
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def _safe_extract_zip(self, z: zipfile.ZipFile, path: str, files_to_extract: list[str] | None = None) -> None:
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"""Extract zipfile safely, preventing path traversal attacks (CWE-22)."""
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abs_path = os.path.realpath(path)
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members = [z.getinfo(f) for f in files_to_extract] if files_to_extract else z.infolist()
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for member in members:
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member_path = os.path.realpath(os.path.join(abs_path, member.filename))
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if not member_path.startswith(abs_path):
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raise ValueError(f"Attempted path traversal in zip file: {member.filename}")
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if files_to_extract is not None:
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for file_name in files_to_extract:
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try:
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z.extract(file_name, path)
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except KeyError:
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logger.warning(f"File {file_name} not found in cache zip.")
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else:
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z.extractall(path=path) # nosec B202:tarfile_unsafe_members - validated above
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def unzip_a_file_into_a_folder(
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self, zip_file_path: str, folder_path: str, files_to_extract: list[str] | None = None
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) -> None:
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@@ -285,14 +302,7 @@ class Env(Generic[ASpecificEnvConf]):
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os.makedirs(folder_path)
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with zipfile.ZipFile(zip_file_path, "r") as z:
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if files_to_extract is not None:
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for file_name in files_to_extract:
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try:
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z.extract(file_name, folder_path)
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except KeyError:
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logger.warning(f"File {file_name} not found in cache zip.")
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else:
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z.extractall(folder_path)
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self._safe_extract_zip(z, folder_path, files_to_extract)
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@abstractmethod
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def prepare(self, *args, **kwargs) -> None: # type: ignore[no-untyped-def]
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@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
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# Requirements for lint.
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bandit
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black
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isort
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mypy
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Reference in New Issue
Block a user