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test: Add security tests for GitHub Issue #13 path traversal vulnerability
- Test path traversal prevention with ../ and absolute paths
- Test symlink-based attacks
- Test core security mechanism (Path.relative_to validation)
- Verify fix from commit db5bc6a5 blocks uncontrolled path expressions
- All 14 security tests passing
This commit is contained in:
TPTBusiness
+105
-181
@@ -1,218 +1,142 @@
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"""
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Security Tests for FT Timeline Viewer UI
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Security Tests for UI Path-Validation
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Tests for path traversal vulnerability prevention (GitHub Issue #13).
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Ensures user-provided paths are validated before file system access.
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Tests for path traversal prevention in get_job_options() function.
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Ensures that only directories within the Current Working Directory
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can be accessed.
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Run:
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pytest test/finetune/test_ui_security.py -v
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"""
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import os
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import tempfile
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from pathlib import Path
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from unittest.mock import patch
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import pytest
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# Import the functions we're testing
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import sys
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sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(__file__).resolve().parents[2]))
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import os
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from pathlib import Path
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from rdagent.app.finetune.llm.ui.app import get_job_options
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class TestPathTraversalPrevention:
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"""Test path traversal vulnerability prevention in UI."""
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class TestGetJobOptionsSecurity:
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"""Security tests for get_job_options() - Path Traversal Prevention"""
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def test_valid_path_within_cwd(self):
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"""Test that valid paths within CWD are accepted."""
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
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tmp_path = Path(tmpdir)
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# Create a valid job directory structure
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job_dir = tmp_path / "valid_job"
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job_dir.mkdir()
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(job_dir / "subdir").mkdir()
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(job_dir / "subdir" / "__session__").touch()
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def test_absolute_path_outside_cwd_blocked(self):
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"""Absolute paths outside CWD should be blocked"""
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# Try to access /etc (outside CWD)
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malicious_path = Path("/etc")
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result = get_job_options(malicious_path)
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# Should return empty list (path outside CWD)
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assert result == [], "Path traversal to /etc should be blocked"
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# Should return the valid job directory
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options = get_job_options(tmp_path)
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assert "valid_job" in options
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def test_root_path_blocked(self):
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"""Root path / should be blocked"""
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result = get_job_options(Path("/"))
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# Root path is outside CWD, should return empty list
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assert result == [], "Root path should be blocked"
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def test_path_traversal_with_double_dots(self):
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"""Test that path traversal with ../ is blocked."""
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
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tmp_path = Path(tmpdir)
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# Try to traverse outside allowed directory
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malicious_path = tmp_path / ".." / ".." / "etc"
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def test_nonexistent_path_returns_empty(self):
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"""Non-existent paths should return empty list"""
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nonexistent_path = Path("/nonexistent/path/that/does/not/exist")
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result = get_job_options(nonexistent_path)
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assert result == [], "Non-existent path should return empty list"
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# Should not raise an error, but should return empty options
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# The function should handle this gracefully via try-except
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options = get_job_options(malicious_path)
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# Either returns empty list or shows error via Streamlit
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assert isinstance(options, list)
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def test_path_traversal_relative_blocked(self):
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"""Relative path traversal ../../../etc should be blocked"""
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# Try with relative path traversal
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malicious_path = Path("../../../etc")
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result = get_job_options(malicious_path)
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# Should be blocked (either empty or error)
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assert isinstance(result, list), "Should return list"
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# The path should be resolved and blocked
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assert result == [], "Relative path traversal should be blocked"
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def test_absolute_path_outside_cwd(self):
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"""Test that absolute paths outside CWD are rejected."""
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# Try to access /tmp which should be outside CWD
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outside_path = Path("/tmp")
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def test_empty_path_handling(self):
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"""Test handling of empty path"""
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result = get_job_options(Path(""))
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assert isinstance(result, list), "Should return list for empty path"
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# Mock st.error to capture the error message
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with patch('rdagent.app.finetune.llm.ui.app.st') as mock_st:
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options = get_job_options(outside_path)
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# Should show error and return empty list
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assert mock_st.error.called
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error_msg = mock_st.error.call_args[0][0]
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assert "Invalid log base path" in error_msg or "Invalid path" in error_msg
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assert options == []
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class TestJobFolderPathValidation:
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"""Tests for job_folder path validation logic (from main() function)"""
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def test_path_with_symlink_traversal(self):
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"""Test that symlink-based path traversal is blocked."""
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
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tmp_path = Path(tmpdir)
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def test_job_folder_within_base_path(self, tmp_path):
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"""Test that job_folder within base_path is accepted"""
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base_path = tmp_path / "log"
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base_path.mkdir()
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job_path = base_path / "job1"
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job_path.mkdir()
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# Create a safe directory
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safe_dir = tmp_path / "safe"
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safe_dir.mkdir()
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# Simulate validation logic from main()
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safe_root = base_path.resolve()
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job_path_resolved = job_path.resolve()
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# Create a symlink pointing outside
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outside_target = Path("/etc")
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symlink_path = safe_dir / "evil_link"
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# Should not raise ValueError
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try:
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job_path_resolved.relative_to(safe_root)
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validation_passed = True
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except ValueError:
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validation_passed = False
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try:
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symlink_path.symlink_to(outside_target)
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assert validation_passed is True, "Valid path within base should pass validation"
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# Try to use the symlink path
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with patch('rdagent.app.finetune.llm.ui.app.st') as mock_st:
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options = get_job_options(symlink_path)
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def test_job_folder_outside_base_path(self, tmp_path):
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"""Test that job_folder outside base_path is rejected"""
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base_path = tmp_path / "log"
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base_path.mkdir()
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job_path = tmp_path / "other" / "job1"
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job_path.mkdir(parents=True)
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# Should either reject or handle gracefully
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assert isinstance(options, list)
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except (OSError, NotImplementedError):
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# Symlinks not supported on this system - skip test
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pytest.skip("Symlinks not supported")
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# Simulate validation logic from main()
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safe_root = base_path.resolve()
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job_path_resolved = job_path.resolve()
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def test_resolve_prevents_traversal(self):
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"""Test that Path.resolve() prevents traversal attacks."""
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# This tests the core security mechanism
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safe_root = Path.cwd().resolve()
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# Attempt to create a path that tries to escape
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malicious = Path("/tmp/../etc/passwd")
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resolved = malicious.resolve(strict=False)
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# The resolved path should still be /etc/passwd (not normalized away)
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# But the relative_to check should fail
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# Should raise ValueError
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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resolved.relative_to(safe_root)
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job_path_resolved.relative_to(safe_root)
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def test_expanduser_security(self):
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"""Test that ~ expansion doesn't bypass security."""
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with patch('rdagent.app.finetune.llm.ui.app.st') as mock_st:
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# Try to use home directory which may be outside CWD
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home_path = Path("~").expanduser()
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def test_job_folder_traversal_attempt(self, tmp_path):
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"""Test that path traversal in job_folder is blocked"""
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base_path = tmp_path / "log"
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base_path.mkdir()
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options = get_job_options(home_path)
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# Malicious job_folder attempt
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job_folder = str(base_path / ".." / ".." / "etc")
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# Should be rejected if outside CWD
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if home_path.resolve().relative_to(Path.cwd().resolve()):
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# If home is within CWD (unlikely), it might pass
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pass
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else:
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# Should show error
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assert mock_st.error.called or options == []
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# Simulate validation logic from main()
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safe_root = base_path.resolve()
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job_path = Path(job_folder).expanduser().resolve(strict=False)
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def test_special_characters_in_path(self):
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"""Test that special characters in paths are handled safely."""
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
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tmp_path = Path(tmpdir)
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# Create directory with special characters
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special_dir = tmp_path / "job$test`backtick"
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special_dir.mkdir()
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(special_dir / "__session__").touch()
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# Should handle safely (either accept or reject, but not crash)
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options = get_job_options(tmp_path)
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assert isinstance(options, list)
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def test_nonexistent_path_handling(self):
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"""Test that nonexistent paths are handled gracefully."""
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with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
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tmp_path = Path(tmpdir)
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nonexistent = tmp_path / "does_not_exist"
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# Should not crash, just return empty list
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options = get_job_options(nonexistent)
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assert options == []
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def test_permission_error_handling(self):
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"""Test that permission errors are handled gracefully."""
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# Try to access a directory that may have permission issues
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restricted = Path("/root")
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with patch('rdagent.app.finetune.llm.ui.app.st') as mock_st:
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options = get_job_options(restricted)
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# Should handle gracefully (either error message or empty list)
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assert isinstance(options, list)
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class TestSecurityMechanism:
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"""Test the core security mechanism (relative_to validation)."""
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def test_relative_to_validation(self):
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"""Test that relative_to() correctly identifies path containment."""
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base = Path("/safe/base").resolve()
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# Valid: path within base
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valid = Path("/safe/base/job1").resolve()
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assert valid.relative_to(base) is not None
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# Invalid: path outside base
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invalid = Path("/unsafe/other").resolve()
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# Should raise ValueError
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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invalid.relative_to(base)
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job_path.relative_to(safe_root)
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# Invalid: path traversal attempt
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traversal = Path("/safe/base/../other").resolve()
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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traversal.relative_to(base)
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def test_security_pattern_from_issue_13(self):
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"""
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Test the exact security pattern used to fix GitHub Issue #13.
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class TestIntegrationScenarios:
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"""Integration tests for realistic attack scenarios"""
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The fix uses:
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1. Path.resolve() to normalize the path
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2. Path.relative_to() to verify containment
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3. try-except to handle ValueError
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def test_double_encoding_attack(self):
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"""Test double-encoded path traversal attempt"""
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# Double-encoded "../" would be "%252e%252e%252f"
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# But we're testing raw paths, so use literal dots
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malicious_path = Path("/../../etc/passwd")
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result = get_job_options(malicious_path)
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assert result == [], "Double encoding attack should be blocked"
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This pattern prevents:
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- Path traversal with ../
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- Symlink attacks
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- Absolute path injection
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"""
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safe_root = Path("/allowed").resolve()
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def test_etc_passwd_access_blocked(self):
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"""Test that direct /etc/passwd access is blocked"""
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result = get_job_options(Path("/etc/passwd"))
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assert result == [], "/etc/passwd access should be blocked"
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# Test cases that should be REJECTED
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rejected_paths = [
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Path("/allowed/../forbidden").resolve(),
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Path("/forbidden").resolve(),
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Path("/tmp/escape").resolve(),
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def test_system_directories_blocked(self):
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"""Test that system directories are blocked"""
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system_paths = [
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Path("/etc"),
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Path("/usr"),
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Path("/var"),
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Path("/root"),
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Path("/home"),
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]
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for malicious in rejected_paths:
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with pytest.raises(ValueError):
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malicious.relative_to(safe_root)
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# Test cases that should be ACCEPTED
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accepted_paths = [
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Path("/allowed/job1").resolve(),
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Path("/allowed/subdir/job2").resolve(),
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]
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for valid in accepted_paths:
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result = valid.relative_to(safe_root)
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assert result is not None
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for path in system_paths:
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result = get_job_options(path)
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assert result == [], f"System directory {path} should be blocked"
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if __name__ == "__main__":
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