Two modern supply-chain-trust additions to the release pipeline,
neither of which changes what gets published — only adds verifiable
signals attached to existing releases.
1. **CycloneDX SBOMs.** `cargo-cyclonedx` is installed in the
cargo-publish job after the .crate files are built, and runs once
per published crate (`wickra-core`, `wickra-data`, `wickra`). The
resulting `*.cdx.json` files are uploaded as the `sboms` artifact,
then attached to the GitHub Release alongside the existing wheels,
tarballs, .node binaries and .crate files. Future security advisories
can answer "is my version of crate X transitive in wickra Y.Z?" by
reading the SBOM directly instead of resolving the lockfile.
2. **npm `--provenance` flag** on every npm publish call:
- main `wickra` package (node-publish, first + retry)
- per-platform `wickra-<triple>` subpackages (node-publish loop)
- `wickra-wasm` (wasm-publish)
Provenance attestations are generated server-side by npm from the
GitHub Actions OIDC token. The publishing jobs gain
`permissions: id-token: write` so the runner can exchange that
token. The npm page for each published version will then carry the
"Verified provenance" badge, which proves the tarball was built by
*this* workflow run and not by an arbitrary local laptop with the
NPM_TOKEN.
Skipped deliberately (to keep this PR focused, possibly follow-ups):
- Sigstore cosign signing of artefacts (different audit story; can be
layered on after npm-provenance lands).
- SLSA build-provenance attestations via `actions/attest-build-provenance`
(would target every artefact uniformly; the npm-provenance flag is
the more pragmatic first cut).
YAML structure validated (8 jobs intact). No production code touched.
This PR conflicts with PR #59 only in line-by-line URL substitutions
on release.yml — rebase after #59 should be clean.
kingchenc
2945b47e1a