Commit Graph
2 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
kingchencandGitHub 49c0fd7dd5 ci: Dependabot cooldown + accept residual zizmor notes (#136)
Clears the remaining zizmor code-scanning findings on this repo.

**Fixed**
- `dependabot-cooldown` (5): a 7-day cooldown on every update ecosystem
  (cargo, npm, pip, ci-pip, github-actions) so Dependabot waits a week after a
  release before opening the bump PR.

**Accepted via `.github/zizmor.yml`** (no workflow code changed)
- `template-injection` (sync-about.yml): false positive — every expansion is the
  internal `grep -c` indicator count, not attacker-controllable.
- `use-trusted-publishing` (release.yml): OIDC migration tracked separately.
- `superfluous-actions` (release.yml): `softprops/action-gh-release` kept deliberately.

Verified with zizmor 1.25.2: 0 findings.
2026-06-02 17:59:46 +02:00
kingchencandGitHub 73415cd2dc ci: zizmor security hardening (#133)
* ci: pass ref context through env in release tag step

zizmor flagged the "Resolve target tag" step in release.yml for
template-injection: github.event_name / github.ref / github.ref_name
were interpolated directly into the shell script. On a tag push the tag
name is attacker-influenceable, so a crafted tag could inject commands.

Move all three context values into the step env and reference them as
shell variables instead. Verified with zizmor 1.16.3: template-injection
findings on release.yml drop from 2 to 0.

* ci: accept release.yml build caches via zizmor config

The release pipeline restores Swatinem/rust-cache and actions/setup-node
caches as a deliberate optimisation. zizmor flags all eight under
cache-poisoning because release.yml publishes to crates.io / PyPI / npm.
The caches are maintainer-controlled and the restore speedup is kept on
purpose, so accept the finding via a zizmor config ignore for release.yml
rather than running cache-free release builds. (Six of the eight are
actions/setup-node, reported at Low confidence.)

Adds .github/zizmor.yml; release.yml now reports 0 high findings.

* ci: drop persisted checkout credentials on read-only jobs

zizmor's artipacked audit flags every actions/checkout that keeps the
default persisted credential: the token is written to the runner's
.git/config, where it can leak if a later step packs .git into an
uploaded artifact, or be read by another step in the same job.

Set persist-credentials: false on the 20 checkouts whose jobs never push
or authenticate to git (build/test/clippy/msrv/coverage/supply-chain/
fuzz/python/wasm/node in ci.yml, plus bench.yml, codeql.yml, the seven
release.yml build/publish jobs, and sync-metadata.yml). The publish and
release jobs authenticate to crates.io / npm / PyPI / the GitHub API with
their own tokens, not persisted git credentials, so this is safe.

sync-about.yml genuinely pushes the indicator-count fix-up to the PR
branch, so it keeps its credential and is accepted via .github/zizmor.yml.
zizmor artipacked for the repo drops to 0 (0 high, 0 medium remaining).
2026-06-02 02:08:40 +02:00