* ci: pass ref context through env in release tag step
zizmor flagged the "Resolve target tag" step in release.yml for
template-injection: github.event_name / github.ref / github.ref_name
were interpolated directly into the shell script. On a tag push the tag
name is attacker-influenceable, so a crafted tag could inject commands.
Move all three context values into the step env and reference them as
shell variables instead. Verified with zizmor 1.16.3: template-injection
findings on release.yml drop from 2 to 0.
* ci: accept release.yml build caches via zizmor config
The release pipeline restores Swatinem/rust-cache and actions/setup-node
caches as a deliberate optimisation. zizmor flags all eight under
cache-poisoning because release.yml publishes to crates.io / PyPI / npm.
The caches are maintainer-controlled and the restore speedup is kept on
purpose, so accept the finding via a zizmor config ignore for release.yml
rather than running cache-free release builds. (Six of the eight are
actions/setup-node, reported at Low confidence.)
Adds .github/zizmor.yml; release.yml now reports 0 high findings.
* ci: drop persisted checkout credentials on read-only jobs
zizmor's artipacked audit flags every actions/checkout that keeps the
default persisted credential: the token is written to the runner's
.git/config, where it can leak if a later step packs .git into an
uploaded artifact, or be read by another step in the same job.
Set persist-credentials: false on the 20 checkouts whose jobs never push
or authenticate to git (build/test/clippy/msrv/coverage/supply-chain/
fuzz/python/wasm/node in ci.yml, plus bench.yml, codeql.yml, the seven
release.yml build/publish jobs, and sync-metadata.yml). The publish and
release jobs authenticate to crates.io / npm / PyPI / the GitHub API with
their own tokens, not persisted git credentials, so this is safe.
sync-about.yml genuinely pushes the indicator-count fix-up to the PR
branch, so it keeps its credential and is accepted via .github/zizmor.yml.
zizmor artipacked for the repo drops to 0 (0 high, 0 medium remaining).
The auto-injected GITHUB_TOKEN defaulted to write-all in ci.yml, bench.yml
and release.yml (no top-level permissions block), and codeql.yml declared
its scopes only at job level. Add a top-level `permissions: contents: read`
to all four so the token starts read-only and only the jobs that genuinely
write through it raise the scope:
- release.yml: github-release keeps contents: write; node-/wasm-publish and
attestations keep their id-token / attestations: write blocks. The
cargo/python/node publish jobs push to crates.io/PyPI/npm via their own
registry secrets, not the GITHUB_TOKEN, so read-only is correct for them.
- codeql.yml: analyze keeps security-events: write (job level).
- ci.yml / bench.yml: no job writes back to the repo (coverage uploads via
CODECOV_TOKEN; bench only uploads an artifact), so no job override is needed.
sync-about.yml already had a top-level block but at contents: write; demote
the top level to read and move contents: write down to the single `sync` job
(the PR-head counter push is the only GITHUB_TOKEN write). The cross-repo
About/docs/webpage/org writes are unaffected — they run through the
fine-grained ABOUT_SYNC_TOKEN, which the permissions key does not govern.
Raises OpenSSF Scorecard Token-Permissions from 0 toward 10.
kingchenc