docs: fix accuracy drift in SECURITY, ARCHITECTURE, THREAT_MODEL (#253)

Documentation-only accuracy fixes from the codebase audit (no code changes).

## SECURITY.md
- Supported-version policy was stale at `0.5.x` while `0.8.3` is published. Bump to the exact `0.8.3` (prose + table `0.8.3 (latest)` / `< 0.8.3`). The exact `x.y.z` form lets `bump_version.py` keep it current automatically (now wired as a touchpoint).

## ARCHITECTURE.md
- `three` → **four** binding crates (the C ABI crate was added).
- workspace diagram `214` → **514** indicators (matches the `mod`-count and `lib.rs` public-type count; now wired into the indicator-wiring automation so it self-heals).
- WASM "does not have automated tests yet" → corrected: `bindings/wasm/src/lib.rs` carries **21** `wasm-bindgen-test` cases.
- **Numerical-stability notes rewritten to match the code:** the sliding-window variance family (`StdDev`, `Variance`, `ZScore`, `Bollinger`) uses running `Σx²−mean²` with clamping (and periodic reseed for `Bollinger`), **not** Welford. True Welford is used only by `IntradayVolatilityProfile` and `SeasonalZScore` (it does not transfer cleanly to a sliding window). The **Kahan-summation** bullet is removed — no Kahan summation exists in the crate.

## THREAT_MODEL.md
- The C ABI is built with `panic = "abort"` and has no `catch_unwind`. Replace the false "catches panics so none cross the boundary" claim with the honest abort strategy (terminates deterministically instead of unwinding across the FFI boundary, which would be UB).
This commit is contained in:
kingchenc
2026-06-11 03:28:19 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 20c0002f8e
commit cb216668ee
3 changed files with 20 additions and 17 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ small.
| Threat | Mitigation |
| --- | --- |
| Memory-safety exploit (buffer overflow, UAF) via crafted input | Pure safe Rust; `unsafe` is forbidden/minimised, so the compiler precludes these classes. |
| Misuse of the C ABI FFI boundary (invalid/dangling handle, undersized batch buffer) | The C ABI (`bindings/c`) is the sole `unsafe` surface. Its shim adds no logic, NULL-checks every handle (returning `NaN`/no-op), writes only into caller-sized buffers, and catches panics so none cross the boundary. A caller passing a non-NULL but dangling pointer is undefined behaviour by C's own contract — out of scope, the same as any C library. |
| Misuse of the C ABI FFI boundary (invalid/dangling handle, undersized batch buffer) | The C ABI (`bindings/c`) is the sole `unsafe` surface. Its shim adds no logic, NULL-checks every handle (returning `NaN`/no-op), writes only into caller-sized buffers, and is built with `panic = "abort"` so a panic terminates the process deterministically instead of unwinding across the FFI boundary (which would be undefined behaviour). A caller passing a non-NULL but dangling pointer is undefined behaviour by C's own contract — out of scope, the same as any C library. |
| Denial of service via malformed/degenerate input (NaN, infinities, extreme magnitudes) | Indicators reject non-finite inputs and validate parameters at construction; update paths are exercised by coverage-guided fuzzing and unit tests for edge cases. |
| Silently incorrect results | 100% line coverage on the core crate; reference-value tests against known-good sources; streaming/batch parity tests. |
| Integer overflow / panics | `clippy::pedantic` with `-D warnings`; debug assertions and overflow checks enabled in test/fuzz builds. |