C ABI: full example suite + docs & About coverage (#224)

Stacked on #222 (base `feat/c-abi-hub`), so the diff is just the additions on top of the hub foundation — no merge of #222 required.

## What this adds

**Examples — full parity with rust/python/node (`examples/c/`)**
- `streaming.c` upgraded to the multi-indicator (SMA/EMA/RSI/MACD + signals) demo
- `backtest.c`, `multi_timeframe.c` (manual time-bucket resampling), `parallel_assets.c` (serial vs OpenMP fan-out, one handle per asset)
- three educational strategies: `strategy_rsi_mean_reversion.c`, `strategy_macd_adx.c`, `strategy_bollinger_squeeze.c`
- two network examples shelling out to `curl`: `fetch_btcusdt.c`, `live_binance.c` (REST poll)
- two header-only helpers (`wickra_csv.h`, `wickra_strategy.h`) since the C ABI ships no IO layer
- CMake builds all 11; the 9 offline ones run under `ctest` on 3 OS; the network two are built-only

**Docs & metadata — surface the C ABI everywhere it was missing**
- ARCHITECTURE diagram + crate table, SECURITY + THREAT_MODEL (the C ABI as the sole `unsafe` FFI surface), the three binding package READMEs, issue/PR templates, CHANGELOG, and the GitHub About template (live About + org description updated too)

**Cleanup**
- removed all references to the private generator tooling from public files (`bindings/c/src/lib.rs` header, `CONTRIBUTING.md`, `sync-about.yml`)

Verified locally: `cargo build -p wickra-c --release`, `cmake + ctest` (9/9 pass), and `-Wall -Wextra -Wpedantic` clean on gcc 13.

THREAT_MODEL.md

@@ -3,8 +3,9 @@
 This document describes Wickra's attack surface and the threats considered,
 together with their mitigations. It complements the security assurance case in
 [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md). Wickra is a computational technical-analysis
-library (a Rust core with Python, Node.js and WebAssembly bindings), not a
-network service or trading system; the attack surface is correspondingly small.
+library (a Rust core with Python, Node.js and WebAssembly bindings plus a C ABI),
+not a network service or trading system; the attack surface is correspondingly
+small.
 
 ## Assets
 
@@ -31,6 +32,7 @@ network service or trading system; the attack surface is correspondingly small.
 | Threat | Mitigation |
 | --- | --- |
 | Memory-safety exploit (buffer overflow, UAF) via crafted input | Pure safe Rust; `unsafe` is forbidden/minimised, so the compiler precludes these classes. |
+| Misuse of the C ABI FFI boundary (invalid/dangling handle, undersized batch buffer) | The C ABI (`bindings/c`) is the sole `unsafe` surface. Its shim adds no logic, NULL-checks every handle (returning `NaN`/no-op), writes only into caller-sized buffers, and catches panics so none cross the boundary. A caller passing a non-NULL but dangling pointer is undefined behaviour by C's own contract — out of scope, the same as any C library. |
 | Denial of service via malformed/degenerate input (NaN, infinities, extreme magnitudes) | Indicators reject non-finite inputs and validate parameters at construction; update paths are exercised by coverage-guided fuzzing and unit tests for edge cases. |
 | Silently incorrect results | 100% line coverage on the core crate; reference-value tests against known-good sources; streaming/batch parity tests. |
 | Integer overflow / panics | `clippy::pedantic` with `-D warnings`; debug assertions and overflow checks enabled in test/fuzz builds. |