fix(security): defend against prompt injection via token metadata

Address HackenProof report GMGNWM-143, where attacker-controlled token metadata
could hijack an AI agent driving gmgn-cli into executing an unauthorized trade.
Move guardrails from overridable SKILL.md text into code.

- Add src/sanitize.ts: neutralize prompt-injection framing and hidden/control
  characters in API output (via printResult) and validate create-token metadata
- Add src/confirm.ts: code-enforced human confirmation for financial writes
  (swap, multi-swap, order strategy create, cooking create) — reads a typed
  "yes" from /dev/tty; automation requires GMGN_ALLOW_AUTOMATED_TRADES=1 + --yes
- Harden config.ts: tighten ~/.config/gmgn/.env to 0600 and warn if world-readable
- Update SKILL.md files, Readme.md and Readme.zh.md to document the gate,
  the --yes flag, and untrusted-metadata handling

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
David Lau
2026-07-20 19:24:50 +08:00
co-authored by Claude Opus 4.8
parent b18d7deb32
commit fdc7a3fb16
11 changed files with 267 additions and 16 deletions
+8 -2
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,14 @@
import { sanitizeForOutput } from "./sanitize.js";
export function printResult(data: unknown, raw?: boolean): void {
// Neutralize any attacker-controlled metadata (token name/symbol/description/
// social links, on-chain URIs, etc.) before it is emitted and read by an AI
// agent. Defends against indirect prompt injection via token metadata.
const safe = sanitizeForOutput(data);
if (raw) {
console.log(JSON.stringify(data));
console.log(JSON.stringify(safe));
} else {
console.log(JSON.stringify(data, null, 2));
console.log(JSON.stringify(safe, null, 2));
}
}