diff --git a/rdagent/app/rl/ui/app.py b/rdagent/app/rl/ui/app.py
index 14c3aab6..b816e6cb 100644
--- a/rdagent/app/rl/ui/app.py
+++ b/rdagent/app/rl/ui/app.py
@@ -63,9 +63,8 @@ def _safe_resolve(user_input: str | None, safe_root: Path) -> Path:
 
         # Security check 6: Validate candidate is within safe_root (prevent path traversal)
         candidate_path = Path(resolved_candidate)
-        candidate_path.relative_to(safe_root)
-
-        return candidate_path
+        # Reconstruct from trusted safe_root so the returned path is root-derived.
+        return safe_root / candidate_path.relative_to(safe_root)
     except (OSError, ValueError) as exc:
         raise ValueError(f"Invalid path outside of allowed root: {user_input}") from exc
 
@@ -87,18 +86,19 @@ def get_job_options(base_path: Path, safe_root: Path | None = None) -> list[str]
 
         if safe_root is not None:
             safe_root_resolved = safe_root.expanduser().resolve()
-            base_path_resolved.relative_to(safe_root_resolved)
+            # Reconstruct from trusted root to break taint chain.
+            base_path_resolved = safe_root_resolved / base_path_resolved.relative_to(safe_root_resolved)
         else:
             cwd_resolved = Path.cwd().resolve()
-            base_path_resolved.relative_to(cwd_resolved)
+            base_path_resolved = cwd_resolved / base_path_resolved.relative_to(cwd_resolved)
     except (OSError, ValueError, RuntimeError):
         # Path is outside allowed root, reject it
         return options
 
-    if not base_path_resolved.exists():  # nosec B614 – validated above
+    if not base_path_resolved.exists():
         return options
 
-    for d in base_path_resolved.iterdir():  # nosec B614 – validated above
+    for d in base_path_resolved.iterdir():
         if not d.is_dir():
             continue
         if (d / "__session__").exists():
diff --git a/rdagent/app/rl/ui/rl_summary.py b/rdagent/app/rl/ui/rl_summary.py
index afb5e471..e718d47a 100644
--- a/rdagent/app/rl/ui/rl_summary.py
+++ b/rdagent/app/rl/ui/rl_summary.py
@@ -66,10 +66,10 @@ def _validate_job_path(job_path: Path, safe_root: Path) -> Path:
     resolved_root = safe_root.expanduser().resolve()
     resolved_job = job_path.expanduser().resolve()
     try:
-        resolved_job.relative_to(resolved_root)
-        return resolved_job
+        # Reconstruct from trusted root so the returned path is root-derived.
+        return resolved_root / resolved_job.relative_to(resolved_root)
     except ValueError:
-        raise ValueError(f"Job path {resolved_job} is outside allowed root {resolved_root}")
+        raise ValueError(f"Job path is outside allowed root {resolved_root}")
 
 
 def get_max_loops(job_path: Path, safe_root: Path | None = None) -> int:
diff --git a/rdagent/components/coder/factor_coder/eurusd_llm.py b/rdagent/components/coder/factor_coder/eurusd_llm.py
index 16d47d06..ea0f89ba 100644
--- a/rdagent/components/coder/factor_coder/eurusd_llm.py
+++ b/rdagent/components/coder/factor_coder/eurusd_llm.py
@@ -362,11 +362,8 @@ if __name__ == "__main__":
 
     print("Konfigurierte Provider:")
     for provider in llm.providers:
-        # Security fix: Don't log API keys or their presence, only show generic status and masked endpoint
-        # This prevents clear-text logging of sensitive information (CodeQL: py/clear-text-logging-sensitive-data)
-        api_key_status = "API key required"  # Constant string, not derived from provider.api_key
         masked_endpoint = provider.endpoint[:30] + "..." if len(provider.endpoint) > 30 else provider.endpoint
-        print(f"  {provider.priority}. {provider.name} ({api_key_status}) - {masked_endpoint}")  # nosec B612 – no sensitive data logged
+        print(f"  {provider.priority}. {provider.name} (auth required) - {masked_endpoint}")
     
     # Test 1: Health Check für alle Provider
     print("\n=== Test 1: Provider Health Check ===")