dienakdz
c3cf230104
- Removed conditional rendering for the assistant guide bar. - Simplified strategy overview and strategy list item components. - Introduced a new modal for selecting strategy mode. - Enhanced strategy creation modal to support script strategies with a dedicated editor. - Updated form handling for script strategies, including validation and submission logic. - Improved user experience with better messaging and streamlined UI components. - Updated translations for better clarity in Chinese.
310 lines
12 KiB
Python
310 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""
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Secure code execution tools
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Provides timeouts, resource limits and a sandbox environment
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"""
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import signal
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import sys
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import os
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import threading
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import traceback
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from typing import Dict, Any, Optional, Tuple
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from contextlib import contextmanager
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from app.utils.logger import get_logger
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logger = get_logger(__name__)
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class TimeoutError(Exception):
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"""Code execution timeout exception"""
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pass
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@contextmanager
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def timeout_context(seconds: int):
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"""
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Code execution timeout context manager
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Notice:
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- Only works on Unix/Linux systems
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- Only valid in the main thread, non-main threads will be downgraded to unlimited timeout
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- Will downgrade to unlimited timeout on Windows
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Args:
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seconds: timeout (seconds)
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"""
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# Check if in main thread
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is_main_thread = threading.current_thread() is threading.main_thread()
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if sys.platform == 'win32':
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# signal.alarm is not supported on Windows, only warnings can be logged
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logger.warning("Windows does not support signal-based timeouts; execution time limits may not work")
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yield
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return
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if not is_main_thread:
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# Non-main threads cannot use signal. Warnings are logged but timeouts are not limited.
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# logger.warning(f"Currently running in a non-main thread (thread: {threading.current_thread().name}),"
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# f"signal timeout is not available, code execution may not limit the time")
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yield
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return
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def timeout_handler(signum, frame):
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raise TimeoutError(f"Code execution timed out after {seconds} seconds")
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try:
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# Set up signal handler
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old_handler = signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, timeout_handler)
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signal.alarm(seconds)
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try:
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yield
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finally:
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# Restore original signal handler
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signal.alarm(0)
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signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, old_handler)
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except ValueError as e:
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# If signal setup fails (such as in some environments), log a warning but do not interrupt execution
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logger.warning(f"Failed to set signal timeout: {str(e)}; execution will continue without timeout enforcement")
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yield
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def safe_exec_code(
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code: str,
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exec_globals: Dict[str, Any],
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exec_locals: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None,
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timeout: int = 30,
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max_memory_mb: Optional[int] = None
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) -> Dict[str, Any]:
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"""
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Safe execution of Python code
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Args:
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code: Python code to execute
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exec_globals: dictionary of global variables
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exec_locals: dictionary of local variables (if None, exec_globals is used)
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timeout: timeout (seconds), default 30 seconds
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max_memory_mb: Maximum memory limit (MB), default 500MB
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Returns:
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Execution result dictionary, including:
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- success: bool, whether the execution was successful
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- error: str, error message (if failure)
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- result: Any, execution result (if any)
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Raises:
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TimeoutError: If the code execution times out
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"""
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if exec_locals is None:
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exec_locals = exec_globals
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# Set memory limit (if supported)
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if max_memory_mb is None:
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max_memory_mb = 500 # Default 500MB
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try:
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# Note: resource.setrlimit is process level and affects the entire API process.
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# The previous global limit of 500MB could prevent parallel strategies/threads from allocating memory.
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# Only set if SAFE_EXEC_ENABLE_RLIMIT is explicitly turned on.
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if sys.platform != 'win32' and os.getenv('SAFE_EXEC_ENABLE_RLIMIT', 'false').lower() == 'true':
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try:
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import resource
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max_memory_bytes = max_memory_mb * 1024 * 1024
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resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (max_memory_bytes, max_memory_bytes))
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logger.debug(f"Memory limit set: {max_memory_mb}MB (SAFE_EXEC_ENABLE_RLIMIT enabled)")
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except (ImportError, ValueError, OSError) as e:
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logger.warning(f"Failed to set memory limit: {str(e)}")
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else:
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logger.debug("No resource memory limit (SAFE_EXEC_ENABLE_RLIMIT disabled or unsupported platform)")
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# On Windows, timeout_context doesn't really limit the time
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# But a warning will be logged
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with timeout_context(timeout):
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exec(code, exec_globals, exec_locals)
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return {
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'success': True,
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'error': None,
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'result': None
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}
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except MemoryError as e:
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error_msg = f"Code execution exceeded the memory limit of {max_memory_mb}MB"
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logger.error(f"Code execution out of memory (limit={max_memory_mb}MB)")
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return {
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'success': False,
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'error': error_msg,
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'result': None
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}
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except TimeoutError as e:
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error_msg = str(e)
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logger.error(f"Code execution timed out (timeout={timeout}s)")
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return {
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'success': False,
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'error': error_msg,
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'result': None
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}
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except Exception as e:
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error_msg = f"Code execution error: {str(e)}\n{traceback.format_exc()}"
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logger.error(f"Code execution error: {str(e)}")
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logger.error(traceback.format_exc())
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return {
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'success': False,
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'error': error_msg,
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'result': None
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}
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def validate_code_safety(code: str) -> Tuple[bool, Optional[str]]:
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"""
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Verify code security (basic check)
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Check your code for dangerous function calls or imports
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Args:
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code: Python code to check
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Returns:
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(is_safe: bool, error_message: Optional[str])
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"""
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import ast
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import re
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# Dangerous keywords and function names
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dangerous_patterns = [
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# System command execution
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r'\bos\.system\b',
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r'\bos\.popen\b',
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r'\bos\.spawn\b',
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r'\bos\.exec\b',
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r'\bos\.fork\b',
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r'\bsubprocess\b',
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r'\bcommands\b',
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# code execution
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r'\b__import__\s*\(',
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r'\beval\s*\(',
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r'\bexec\s*\(',
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r'\bcompile\s*\(',
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# File operations
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r'\bopen\s*\(',
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r'\bfile\s*\(',
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r'\b__builtins__\b',
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# module import
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r'\bimport\s+os\b',
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r'\bimport\s+sys\b',
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r'\bimport\s+subprocess\b',
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r'\bimport\s+pymysql\b',
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r'\bimport\s+sqlite3\b',
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r'\bimport\s+requests\b',
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r'\bimport\s+urllib\b',
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r'\bimport\s+http\b',
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r'\bimport\s+socket\b',
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r'\bimport\s+ftplib\b',
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r'\bimport\s+telnetlib\b',
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r'\bimport\s+pickle\b',
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r'\bimport\s+cpickle\b',
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r'\bimport\s+marshal\b',
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r'\bimport\s+ctypes\b',
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r'\bimport\s+multiprocessing\b',
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r'\bimport\s+threading\b',
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r'\bimport\s+concurrent\b',
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# Reflection and metaprogramming (possibly used to bypass restrictions)
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r'\bgetattr\s*\(.*__import__',
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r'\bgetattr\s*\(.*eval',
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r'\bgetattr\s*\(.*exec',
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r'\bsetattr\s*\(',
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r'\b__getattribute__\b',
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r'\b__setattr__\b',
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r'\b__dict__\b',
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r'\bglobals\s*\(',
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r'\blocals\s*\(',
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r'\bdir\s*\(',
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r'\btype\s*\(.*\)\s*\(', # type() may be used to create new types
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r'\b__class__\b',
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r'\b__bases__\b',
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r'\b__subclasses__\b',
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r'\b__mro__\b',
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r'\b__init__\b.*__import__',
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r'\b__new__\b.*__import__',
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# Other dangerous operations
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r'\b__builtins__\s*\[',
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r'\b__builtins__\s*\.',
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r'\b__import__\s*\(',
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r'\bimportlib\b',
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r'\bimp\b',
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]
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# Check your code for dangerous patterns
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for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
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if re.search(pattern, code):
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return False, f"Dangerous code pattern detected: {pattern}"
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# Try parsing the AST, checking for dangerous nodes
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try:
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tree = ast.parse(code)
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# List of dangerous modules (extended)
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dangerous_modules = [
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'os', 'sys', 'subprocess', 'pymysql', 'sqlite3',
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'requests', 'urllib', 'http', 'socket', 'ftplib', 'telnetlib',
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'pickle', 'cpickle', 'marshal', 'ctypes',
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'multiprocessing', 'threading', 'concurrent',
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'importlib', 'imp', 'builtins'
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]
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# List of dangerous functions (extended)
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# Note: hasattr is safe and is only used to check attributes, not to access
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dangerous_functions = [
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'eval', 'exec', 'compile', '__import__',
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'getattr', 'setattr', 'delattr', # hasattr has been removed, it is safe
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'globals', 'locals', 'vars', 'dir', 'type'
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]
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# Check for dangerous function calls
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for node in ast.walk(tree):
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# Check for calls to dangerous functions
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if isinstance(node, ast.Call):
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if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name):
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func_name = node.func.id
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if func_name in dangerous_functions:
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return False, f"Dangerous function call detected: {func_name}()"
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# Check if there are calls to os.system etc.
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if isinstance(node.func, ast.Attribute):
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if isinstance(node.func.value, ast.Name):
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if node.func.value.id in dangerous_modules:
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return False, f"Dangerous module call detected: {node.func.value.id}.{node.func.attr}"
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# Check if there are bypass methods such as getattr(builtins, '__import__')
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if isinstance(node.func, ast.Name) and node.func.id == 'getattr':
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# Check the parameters of getattr
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if len(node.args) >= 2:
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if isinstance(node.args[0], ast.Name) and node.args[0].id in ['builtins', '__builtins__']:
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if isinstance(node.args[1], ast.Constant) and node.args[1].value in dangerous_functions:
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return False, f"Detected an attempt to bypass restrictions via getattr: getattr({node.args[0].id}, '{node.args[1].value}')"
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# Check the import statement: the use of import is prohibited in user scripts (security dependencies are uniformly injected by the platform)
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for node in ast.walk(tree):
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if isinstance(node, ast.Import):
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return False, "Import statements are not allowed in scripts. Use the platform-provided objects such as pd and np directly."
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if isinstance(node, ast.ImportFrom):
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return False, "Import statements are not allowed in scripts. Use the platform-provided objects such as pd and np directly."
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# Check if there is an attempt to access __builtins__
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for node in ast.walk(tree):
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if isinstance(node, ast.Attribute):
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if isinstance(node.attr, str) and node.attr.startswith('__') and node.attr.endswith('__'):
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if node.attr in ['__builtins__', '__import__', '__class__', '__bases__', '__subclasses__', '__mro__']:
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# Check if used in dangerous context
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if isinstance(node.value, ast.Name) and node.value.id in ['builtins', '__builtins__']:
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return False, f"Dangerous attribute access detected: {node.value.id}.{node.attr}"
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except SyntaxError as e:
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return False, f"Code syntax error: {str(e)}"
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except Exception as e:
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# If AST parsing fails, log a warning but allow to continue (possibly incomplete code)
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logger.warning(f"AST parse failed; skipping safety checks: {str(e)}")
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return True, None
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